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Brief of Appellants
This appeal has to do with only one question. Did
the plaintiff establish negligence on the part of defendant? The facts are uncontradicted and \\'ere presented
by plaintiff as part of plaintiff's case. The defendants
presented no evidence because defendant \nu; called in
plaintiff's case and related the facts as to the mechanical
failure in defendants' car without prior warning, which
caused the accident. These are the facts as established
by plaintiff:
1
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Huber, with consent of her father, drove
the fan1ily car to school on January 16, 1953. She was
on that date within 26 days of her 18th birthday (R. 66).
The car was a 1949 Kaiser sedan. She resided at 2471
Douglas Street, Salt Lake City, and in driving the car
to school had driven it in heavy traffic along 13th East
Street, almost bumper to bumper, using the brakes,
which were working all right (R. 80). She parked her
car on 8th South (R. 67) while she was in school, and
then when she left school she drove west on 8th South
to 11th East, coming almost to a complete stop at that
intersection, made a right turn on 11th East and drove
north. In proceeding down 8th South she used the brake
and it went nicely, depressing about one-fourth of the
way down and she had full braking power (R. 68, 69).
Prior to the accident the brakes were full, always held,
and she had no trouble with them (R. 69). About a
block away from the intersection of 11th East and 5th
South she saw vehicles stopped at the 5th South intersection. She was traveling at about twenty or twentyfive miles per hour (R. 71) and while approaching the
intersection released the pressure on the gas and the
compression slowed the car to a bout fifteen miles per
hour (R. 72, 7:3). About 2¥2 to 3 car lengths away from
the plaintiff's car (about the length of Judge Baker's
court room) (R. 73} she applied her brakes and the
brake pedal went to the floor boards (R. 73, 74). She
pumped the brakes two or three times and they didn't
hold at all and she hit plaintiff's car in the rear (R. 74),
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which was stopped at the intersection. The car was
equipped with a hand brake in good condition, but she
didn't have time to use it after she discovered that the
foot brake had failed (R. 75 ), nor did she have time to
turn to a Yoid the collision after such discovery ( R. 75).

"Q. Do yon think you would haYe had time to
turn out if you had turned after the first pump
of the brake"?
A. No, I d.on 't believe so. ''
The Sunday before the accident she had driven the
car to Brighton to ski and the brakes were functioning
all right (R. 78). On the date of the accident she had
no occasion to use the brakes between 8th South and 5th
South until just a few car lengths before the accident
(R. 79) and when the brake pedal went to the floor and
she had no brakes she was shocked and surprised. The
hill on 8th South is steep and the brakes were entirely
sufficient to bring her to almost a complete stop and
enable her to make a right-hand turn. (R. 78, 79). After
the accident, it was discovered that the master cylinder
was the cause of the trouble (R. 77).
This was the evidence produced by plaintiff as to
the cause of the accident and the conduct of defendant
with reference thereto.
POH\rrs
1. THE rrRIAL COUHT EHRJ1JD IN DENYING
~rorriON OF DEFENDANTS FOR DISlVliSSAL Arr
THE CONCLUSION OF PLAINTIFF'S CASE.

3
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2. rrHE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING
TO DIRECT A VERDICT FOR DEFENDANTS.
3. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING
:MOTION OF DEFENDANTS TO SET ASIDE VERDICT AND ENTER JUDGMENT FOR SAID DEFENDANTS.
Upon the foregoing evidence presented by plaintiff
as to the cause of the accident, defendants rested their
case without the presentation of any evidence, moved
the court for a directed verdict, which was denied (R.
125, 126) and moved the court for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict (R. 139), which was likewise denied (R. 140).
ARGU~IENT

Concisely stated, the point raised by all three of
the above propositions is :

WHERE AN ACCIDENT OCCURS BY REASON
OF SUDDEN MECHANICAL FAILURE, WITHOUT
REASON TO ANTICIPATE SUCH EVENT, AND
WITH JUSTIFIABLE REASON TO BELIEVE THE
:MECHANISM TO BE PROPER .AND IN GOOD CONDITION, XO NEGLIGENCE IS SHOWN AS A
MATTER OF LAW. IT IS AN ACCIDENT FOR
THE OCCURRENCE OF \VHICH XO LIABILITY
ATTACHES.
The trial court recognized the correctness of the
above statement of law by giving the following instruc4
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tions to the jury, from which plaintiff does not crossappeal, and it is the law of this case.

"INSTRUCTION NO. 8
"You are instructed that the fact that a collision occurred and injury and damages resulted
does not of itself show that it was produced by
negligence. Such a result may be the result solely
of accident. If this collision occurred without it
being produced, in whole or in part, by the negligence of :Marilynn Huber, then it was an unavoidable accident.

''An owner or operator of a motor vehicle is
not an insurer against injuries or damage being
caused by its operation but is liable only for
negligence, and hence, an injury caused by the
vehicle, without any negligence or ·wrong on the
part of or attributable to the owner or operator,
is considered as an unavoidable accident, for the
consequences of which neither the owner nor the
operator can be held responsible. Thus, you are
further instructed that where the brakes of an
automobile have previously functioned properly
but suddenly, and without warning·, failed to
respond, their failure does not render the owner
or operator guilt~, of negligence unless they had
previous knowledge of the defective condition."
''IXSTRUCTION NO. 9
"You are instructed that where the operator
of a motor vehicle is h~T a sm1den c·mergenc~,
placed in a position of imminent peril to herself
or to another, without sufficient time in which to
determine with certaint~' the best course to pursue, she is not held to the same accuracy of judgment as is required of her undc·r ordinary circumstances, and is not lia hlc• for injuries or damages
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eauseu by her if an accident oeenrs, eYen though
a course of action other than that which she pursued might have been more judicious, provided
she exercised ordinary care in the stress of the
circumstances to avoid an accident.'' (R. 24-25)
The above evidence being un_disputed, without conflict, in fact produced by plaintiff herself, it is manifest
that the jury disregarded the evidence; and that the
trial court in its rulings with reference thereto failed
to apply the law which the court itself pronounced to
be the law applicable to the facts of the case.
There being no dispute on the facts, it \Yas a law
question for the court and should have been so regarded.
It was not a case of the jury believing or not believing evidence presented by defendant. The evidence was
presented hy plaintiff as a part of plaintiff's case.
That the above law is sound is amply sustained by
the authorities.
Section 41-6-144, U.C.A. 1933, proYides that every
motor vehicle when operated on the highway shall be
equipped with brakes adequate to control movement and
stop the vehicle, including two separate means of applying the brakes, each of which shall be effective to
apply the brakes to at least two wheels. This statute
is substantially the same as similar statutes in other
states. Courts generally, including this Court, have held
that violation of these traffic laws is negligence per se
unless such violation is excused by reason of a sudden
emergency which reasonable prudence could not foresee,
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such as unanticipated mechanical failure immediately
prior to the accident. This is true as to all traffic violations, liability for which is not absolute, but rebuttable
upon proper showing. Lights may be suddenly extinguished; steering gear or other equipment break; or a
tire blow out ; or some other part of the mechanism fail.
The opera tor of a -vehicle is not an insurer as to the
condition of his car so long as he does not act negligently
'vith reference thereto. \Y e respectfully submit that
under the following authorities the trial court was in
error in its rulings.
This Court, in '"~1 orrison vs. Perry, 104 Utah 139,
140 Pac. 2d 772, considered the violation of a traffic
law, the result of explanation, and the fact that any
presumption disappears where the evidence is uncontradicted and stands alone.
"Defendant in his brief says that it is true that
when a collision occurs on the defendant's wrong
side of the road a presumption of negligence
arises in the absence of evidence explaining why
his car was on the wrong side of the road. Defendant then vigorously argues that the moment
an explanation is offered the presumption ceases
and does not longer exist. This is true, but the
evidence upon which the presumption was based
remains in the case and is to he eonsidered h~r
the jnr.v, unless there is no conflict between such
evidence and the explanatory evidence. See State
v. Green, 78 Utah 580, 6 P. 2(1 177; Buckley v.
Francis, 78 Utah 606, 6 P. 2d 188; 9 Wigmore on
EvidenrP (3rd Ed.) Sec. 2491.. Defendant cites
Saltas v. Affleck, 99 Utah 65, 102 P. 2cl 493, 495.
In that ca~0 the court said: 'rrhe evidence offered
7
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in rebuttal of the presumption of the agency of
the driver from proof of ownership may be so
uncontradicted and conclusive as to entitle the
court to say as a matter of law that the presumption ha~ been rebutted.' Here "·e do not believe
such evidence to be conclusive.''
In that case there was other evidence to be considered, but in this case there was not. The fact that
under our rules the plaintiff is not bound by the evidence
of an adverse party which he presents, does not have
the effect of eliminating the evidence. It was the only
evidence on the subject.

lVhite c. Pinney, 99 Utah 484, 108 Pac. 2d 249. This
was a case arising under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur;
hence unlike the present case where no inference is involved, but the question of mechanical failure was
involved and it is pertinent ju that regard. Here is what
this court said :
''Defendants would not be liable for accident
resulting from a defect in the mechanism of their
truck and equipment of "Thich they had no knowledge, and which would not be revealed by reasonable and prudent inspection. \Y e quote from 3
Huddy: Cyelopedia of .:\utomobile Law, 9th Ed.,
Section 71:
'' 'G-enerall~T speaking, 1t js the duty of one
operating a motor vehicle on the public highways
to see that it is in reasonably good condition and
properly equipped, so that it may be at all times
controlled, and not become a source of danger to
its occupants or to other travelers.
'' 'To this end, the owner or operator of a
motor vehicle must exercise reasonable care in the
8
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inspection of the machine, and is chargeable with
notice of everything that such inspection would
disclose. This rule applies whether the operator
is the owner of the vehicle or rents it from another, or permits another to use it, or lets it to
another for hire. But, in the absence of anything
to show that the appliances were defective, the
owner or driver is not required to inspect them
before using the car or permitting it to be used.'
"The great weight of authority holds that there
is no liability on the part of the owner where an
outsider has been injured by a defective mechanism which was unknown to the owner and which
would not have been disclosed by a reasonable
inspection. * * *
''The owner or operator of a motor vehicle
must exercise reasonable care in the inspection
of the machine, but in the absence of anything to
show the appliances were defective the owner or
driver is not required to inspect them each day
before using or permitting them to be used. * * *
If the operator or person in charge of such vehicle
has done all that would be expected of an ordinarily prudent person, and a failure of his equipment occurs, not reasonably foreseen, he is not
guilty of negligence.''
~umerous authorities are cited and approved, Including Huddy, to sustain the law announced.

This case was reaffirmed as to its applicable law
in vVyatt rs. Baughman, ...... Utah ...... , 239 Pac. 2d 193.

Ilanson vs. Weckerle (Cal.), 63 Pac. 2d 323. This
was a case involving faulty brakes, becoming manifest
just prior to the accident. The court said :
9
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''However, we are of the opinion from the facts
set out in the record that the brakes had held the
backward movement of the automobile some
twenty times previous to the accident, and likewise stopped the backward movement of the
vehicle within 5 or 6 feet at the time of the accident, establishes beyond controversy the efficiency
of the brakes. Notwithstanding the length of the
arguments both for appellant and for the respondents, there are just a few questions involved in
this case, i.e., whether the appellant used due
diligence in the stopping of the truck, or was
negligent in :O.ot applying the brakes preceding the
actual stopping of the engine and the commencement of the backward movement. In other words,
from the previous use of the brakes on the truck,
in stopping the same, should the appellant have
apprehended the immediate failure of the engine,
and at the moment of stopping, had his brakes
so applied as to prevent any backward movements"? The testimony shows that Hanson was
accustomed to block the truck when it stopped;
that he was somewhere outside of the truck for
that purpose at the time it stopped. Prior to the
accident there had been no backward movement
of the truck, and therefore he had a right to
assume that when the truck stopped, it would
stand stationary as on former occasions, and that
the block might be immediately placed in position.''
Trudeau, et al. vs. Sina Contracting Co. (~linn.), 62
N.W. 2d 492. The court held that evidence of faulty
brakes was prima facie evidence of negligence, but added
that it was not conclusiYe evidence of liability, and holding that if defendant was confronted with a sudden
emergenc~· through no fault of his own it was excusable

10
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and there was no liability. This was a brake case very
similar in mauy respects to the case at bar.
Sotlwron

li.

TV est, 180

~I<l.

539; 26 Atl. 2d 16:

''This is not the case of a latent defect which
could not have been discovered. A person driving
a ~t range car for the first time owes a duty to
the public to see that there are no obvious defects
in its mechanism which are apt to cause injury
to others. DefectiYe brakes are obvious, because
they can be detected by the simple pressure of a
foot. The test is so simple that anyone can make
it. If such a test shows the brakes in working
order, and then they suddenly fail, the driver may
not be liable for negligence in driving with them.
If no test is made, if the brakes are not even tried,
the driver cannot rely upon a presumption that
the machine is safe. He will not then be excused
from liaoility for the destruction he may cause
upon the public highway because he did not know
his brakes were bad.''
In the instant case a test was made on 8th South
hill immediately prior to the accident and several times
prior to the accident in driving the car in traffic, and
they were found to be in good working order. It was a
sudden mechanical failure without warning.
The Supreme Court of California stated the general
rule in 1'-. af:terlee v. Orange Glenn School District, 177
Pac. 2d 279. Violation of a statute is negligence per se
or presumptive negligence but stated the following:
1

''An act which is performed in violation of an
ordinance or statute is presumptively an act of
negligence, but the presumption is not conclusive
11
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and may be rebutted by showing that the act was
justifiable or excusable under the circumstances.
* * *
''Thus in Rath v. Bankston, supra, where an
automobile was parked partly on the highway in
violation of the statute, the defendant was allowed
to show that despite reasonably careful inspection
the gasoline supply became exhausted, and the
car stalled. In another case where a collision
occurred with a car which had no taillight, evidence that the light was inspected and found in
good order a short time before was held admissible to negative the presumption of negligence.''
5 Am. J ur. 642, Sec. 252, Automobiles :
"On the other hand, the mere failure of brakes
to function properly is not conclusive of the
driver's negligence. It seems that where the
brakes on an automobile have preYiously functioned properly, but suddenly fail to respond,
their failure does not render the owner guilty of
negligence or contributory negligence, unless he
had knowledge of the defective condition. Nor
is driving· on a public highway an automobile "·ith
defective brakes, contrary to the provisions of the
statute, negligence per se which will render the
driver absolutely liable for resulting injuries, regardless of circumstances.''
60 C.J.S. 638, under "~Iotor Vehicles" has the following to say relating to brakes and violation of statutes
relating thereto :
"Violation as negligence. While there is authority to the contrary, operation of a motor
Yehicle ,,·ithout adequate brakes, in violation of a
statute or ordinance, has been held to constitute
negligence per se or prima facie evidence of an

12
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intent to violate the statute in this respect, rendering the motorist liable for injuries proximately
resulting from such defect. However, he will not
be responsible where he is not chargeable with
negligence in respect of the defect in the brakes,
as where he was excusably ignorant of their defective condition, and the mere fact that a motor
vehicle had defective brakes does not show actionable negligence imposing liability for injuries
where such defect was not the proximate cause
of the accident.''
Huddy Ency. of Automobile Law 3-4, Sec. 72, it is
stated that failure to have a car equipped with proper
brakes is negligence per se, but adds :
"Where, however, there has been no lack of
care on the part of the owner or operator, and
the failure of the brakes is unexpected, or the
result of an accident, no liability ensues."
Brotherton z;s. Day & Night Fuel Co. (Wash.), 73
Pac. 2d 788:
"While it is true that violation of a statute is,
generally speaking, negligence per se, it is also
true that such violation is not negligence when
due to some cause beyond the violator's control,
and which reasonable prudence could not have
guarded against.''
This doctrine was reaffirmed by the Washington
Court in Jess vs. McNamen, 255 Pac. 2d 902.
Bryant, et al. v. Tulare Ice Co. (Cal.), 270 Pac. 2d
880:

13
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"While the general rule is that the violation
of a statute is presumptive evidence of negligence
it is also well established that in an emergency
or under unusual conditions circumstances may
be shown to excuse the violation.''

Howard v. Ringsby Truck Lines, 2 Utah 2d 65, 269
Pac. 2d 295. This court considered and passed upon the
degree of care required of a party in an emergency,
approving the doctrine announced in Restatement of
the Law of Torts, 769, and used the following language:
"It must be borne in mind, however, that Byington was faced with a sudden and unexpected
happening-and emergency-not caused by his
own tortious conduct, and consequently he is relieved of the same coolness of judgment which
would be required of him in the absence of an
emergency. * ~, "' Human reactions are not instantaneous and the time required to react varies
according to the nature of the danger and the
surrounding circumstances. * * * During this
brief interval, Byington had to react to the
danger, determine a course of action and stop a
truck traveling 45 miles per hour. We are in
accord with the following apropos statement
made by the court in Rollison v. Wabash R. Co.,
252 :Mo. 525, 160 S. W. 994, 999:

'' '* * >~:, To predicate negligence on two seconds
of time is in and of itself a monumental refinement. We cannot adjudicate negligence on such
pulse beats and hairsplitting, such airy nothings
of surmise.' ''
53 American J ur. 263, Sec. 326, under ''Trial'':
''Upon proper motion the court may grant a
non-suit where the evidence establishes facts
14
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constituting a complete defense to the action or
the existence of such a defense is admitted.''
In this case the plaintiff herself presented the defense and the facts constituting the defense.
See also Stark's Estate (Cal.), 119 Pac. 2d 961.

vV e respectfully submit that there was no issue of
fact for submission to the jury; the evidence was uncontradicted, not susceptible of different interpretation
by different individuals, and it was a law question for
the court. Plaintiff, by presenting the defense as well
as her case, was in the same position as a party who
sues on a note and then proves as a part of her case that
there is no liabiltiy on the note.
Respectfully submitted,
RICH, ELTON & :MANGUM
ALVIN I. SMITH
Attorneys for Appellants
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